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ABSTRACT

Networks play an important role in the Indigenous rights movement’s strategies
and in Indigenous groups’ engagements with industry actors, the State, and
NGOs. We seek to extend the concept of Governance Generating Networks
(GGN) to incorporate Indigenous grassroots movements, and evaluate multiscale
interactions and processes of network-generated governance across scales. We
compare the NoDAPL movement led by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe in the
U.S. with grassroots Indigenous-environmentalist networks of water defenders in
the Komi Republic, Russia. These GGNs emerged to protest oil pipelines within
two contrasting sociopolitical systems, yet demonstrate substantial similarities in
respect to local grievances and global engagement. We find that the resonance of
these movements across scales was substantial. These reactions exhibited dis
sonance between scales, when national and regional actors responded in diver
ging ways. The two Indigenous-led movements were also able to amplify their
agendas and transfer strategic alliances to other places and issues.
KEYWORDS Indigenous protests; non-governmental organizations; global governance; governance

generating networks; social movements; governance of transnational corporations

Introduction
Indigenous communities around the world, facing unprecedented pressures
from expansion of industrial infrastructure (Arsenault et al. 2019), are respond
ing with resistance. While grassroots environmental and Indigenous rights
movements remain locally rooted, they have frequently become globally
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connected networks by appealing to global governance institutions, such as the
United Nations (UN) (Keck and Sikkink 2014, Ignatow 2008, Pierk and
Tysiachniouk 2016), especially when national policy contradicts the interests of
the social movement and/or when this policy is not clearly defined (Rootes 2013).
Such transnationalization occurs when movements have little power and
few political opportunities in their home states (Rucht 1999, Keck and
Sikkink 2014, Tormos-Aponte and García-López 2018, Bourne 2018), or
when local and transnational civil society networks reinforce each other
(Kraemer et al. 2013). While mobilization of national and transnational
activists’ networks against corporate behavior has been well-studied, there
is a knowledge gap regarding the impacts of globalized Indigenous-led
environmental grassroots movements on the relationships between actors
and institutions involved in resource extraction governance.
Using Governance Generating Networks (GGN) and ‘politics of scale’ fram
ing, this study aims to understand how Indigenous-led grassroots resistance can
shape the governance of large industrial operations at a range of scales. We
analyze two anti-pipeline Indigenous-led water protector movements: No
Dakota Access Pipeline (NoDAPL), led by members of the Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe (SRST) in North and South Dakota; and resistance to outdated oil
pipelines, led by the Komi-Izhemtsy People in the Komi Republic, Russia.
Despite developing in distinct sociopolitical settings, both cases provide vivid
illustrations of global-to-local connections made by Indigenous-led grassroots
movements and their impacts at various scales. The research questions are:
(1) How do Indigenous-led environmental resistance movements and
their globalization affect relationships between actors and institutions
at different spatial scales?
(2) What are the commonalities and differences between the influence of
Indigenous-led environmental resistance movements in Russia and
the U.S. in shaping governance of the oil sector?

Theoretical framework
‘Politics of scale’ involve spaces in which power and authority are exercised.
‘Scale frames’ reflect discourses of actors seeking to change policy (Edge and
Eyles 2014). In the transnational sociology of networks and flows, scale is
a space of interaction between actors not limited to a nested hierarchy, e.g.
from local to national to global (Spaargaren et al. 2006, Tysiachniouk 2012).
Scalar boundaries may be contested and determined by power and authority of
various actors (Mansfield and Haas 2006). Moving beyond strict scalar hier
archies, we follow Castells (2013) in distinguishing between spaces of places
(geographically-determined sites of implementation) and transnational spaces
(human interactions that occur at a distance). Often, spaces – both
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transnational and embedded in local specificities, stretching across scalar
hierarchies – have gained particular importance in governance and policy
studies (Pries 2005, Sassen 2008). The Governance Generating Network
(GGN) concept used here builds on theoretical developments around the
‘politics of scale’ and operationalizes the sociology of networks and flows to
analyze particular extractive sector activities and their outcomes. GGN focuses
on how new governance frameworks are generated through networks, while
capturing new places and scales (Tysiachniouk 2012).
GGNs set new global agendas and/or develop global regulatory products
using global standards, rules, or recommendations. GGNs link transnational
spaces with spaces of places. Local actors can initiate bottom-up GGNs: NGOled campaigns direct grievances toward global institutions to set new global
agendas (Tysiachniouk 2012). Networks may emphasize the interests emerging
at the local scale, while in the long term, policies and standards develop at the
global scale (Merk 2009). In turn, actors operating transnationally create topdown GGNs to foster institutional changes in spaces of places by implementing
global standards locally (Tysiachniouk et al. 2018b, Tulaeva et al. 2019). Bottomup GGNs’ petitions to the global scale also may involve actors, networks, and
institutions at national and regional scales, as well as those operating across
scales. The resultant multiscale GGNs manifest through structurally-connected
transnational nodes of global governance design, fora of negotiation, and sites of
implementation. Some GGNs are characterized by two-way exchange of infor
mation through organized interactions between local and transnational actors
(Tysiachniouk and McDermott 2016) [see Figure 1]. Therefore, GGN framing is
well-suited for analyzing efforts undertaken by networks of actors seeking
vertical coherence between globally-agreed rules and existing local practices,
e.g. policy implementation patterns (Eimer and Bartels 2020).
Transnational nodes of governance design include global institutions that
develop or facilitate frameworks for interaction between Indigenous Peoples,
businesses, and states. For instance, the UN, the World Bank, and the Extractive
Industry Transparency Initiative all develop guidelines for oil companies to
ensure the sustainability of oil production and protect Indigenous rights.
Governance decisions are made not only in the nodes of design, but also in
fora of negotiation and sites of implementation (Tysiachniouk 2012). In addi
tion to global fora, national, regional, and local fora can take place, e.g. at public
hearings or resistance camps. Fora involving multi-scalar actors may reinforce
power of existing elites or, less likely, empower Indigenous and/or local
communities (Eimer and Bartels 2020). Sites of implementation are geographic
places that exert impacts on local and Indigenous communities.
Our work enriches the GGN framework by incorporating insights from
the ‘politics of scale’ literature (Griffin 2009), which highlights how actors
build links between sites of implementation, where contested issues emerge,
and other scales, at which grievances could be addressed and new policies
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Figure 1. Governance generating network (Tysiachniouk et al. 2018a).

created. Stakeholders and their networks impose differing scalar interrela
tionships that lead to rescaling of decision-making processes, to scales that
were not previously involved (Griffin 2009). When protesters connect with
multiple groups of activists with diverse agendas loosely related to the
original conflict, they acquire new allies, with different grievances, possibly
resulting in ‘scale shifts’ (McAdam et al. 2001, Rootes 2013). Even if the
campaign tackles only the global scale directly, effects may occur at other
scales. Therefore, ‘scale shifts’ of protestor networks’ grievances toward the
global scale in GGN may result in processes that we label resonance, dis
sonance, and amplification. These ‘scale shifts’ do not necessarily resolve local
issues, yet involve interactions and changes at other scales.
Resonance describes effects across scales. Local actions produce effects at
regional, national, and international scales, through bottom-up flows of infor
mation and pressure; in turn, global actions produce top-down effects at other
scales. Effects may include legislative changes, acknowledgement and/or
repression of Indigenous rights, development of new rules and/or guidelines
for extractive industries, etc. Dissonance is a type of resonance that occurs when
institutional actors at different scales respond to local actions in contradictory
ways. Finally, as a grassroots movement grows, it may exhibit amplification, in
which additional actors with similar interests support the movement, deliber
ately through frame alignment processes (Snow 2013, Snow et al. 2018) or
inadvertently as outsiders discover the movement. Amplification may also
involve the movement’s incorporation of issues beyond its original agenda, or
inspiration of similar movements in other localities.
We compare two bottom-up, Indigenous-led GGNs that emerged around
water protection issues as a response to acts of ‘infrastructure violence’
(Rodgers and O’neill 2012) through pipeline construction and operation in
Russia and the U.S. We analyze the dynamics that unfold as place-based
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actors attempt to influence the behavior of others through transnational
resistance networks, in which multiple negotiations occur on both transna
tional and local levels. We examine the interrelations of GGN actors, which
represent multilevel and multifactor global assemblages, operating at differ
ent scales (Tysiachniouk and McDermott 2016).

Methods
For the Komi study, we conducted three focus groups (10–12 participants in
each) with activists and 48 in-person semi-structured interviews, as well as two
online interviews, between February-April 2015, January-February 2016, and
December 2019-January 2020 with NGO members, Indigenous rights activists,
regional and national government officials, and company representatives. The
NoDAPL study consisted of 39 in-person semi-structured interviews in
July 2017, May-June 2018 and April-June 2019, with Tribal members, Tribal
government officials, law enforcement officers, NGO representatives, govern
ment officials, and lawyers, in addition to 20 telephone and online interviews
between 2017–2020, with lawyers, activists, current and former government
officials, and academics. We also conducted participant observation. In Russia,
in February 2015, we observed one meeting between Indigenous rights and
environmental grassroots groups, and another between activists and local
citizens. At the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation, in January 2017, we observed
meetings run by experts from the International Working Group on Indigenous
Affairs (IWGIA), the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, and
the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC), collecting testimonies on
human rights violations during the NoDAPL movement. In both cases, inter
views and observations focused on the Indigenous-led movements’ engage
ments with companies, NGOs, and government agencies.
The NoDAPL movement
The Standing Rock Sioux Reservation, which stretches from south-central
North Dakota to north-central South Dakota (see Figure 2), is home to the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe (SRST), a federally recognized U.S. tribe with a trust
land base of 841,700 acres and an estimated enrollment of 15,568 members
(Indian Affairs n.d.), most of whom identify as Lakota or Dakota (Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe n.d.). The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution and
Federal Indian Law recognize tribal sovereignty and the federal government’s
trust responsibility, while restricting states’ authority (Newton et al. 2019).
Conversely, tribes have limited power over state governments despite
a significant land base (Schroedel and Aslanian 2015, Stambaugh 2019). This
creates complicated entanglements, compounded by historical legacies, where
one party may question the other’s authority.
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Figure 2. SRST and DAPL.

Over half of North Dakota’s daily production currently flows through the
Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL), a subterranean 1,172-mile pipeline owned
by Dallas-based Energy Transfer Partners (ETP), which extends from North
Dakota to southern Illinois. DAPL’s 3.7 USD billion price tag was financed
by a 17-bank consortium, with a 2.5 USD billion loan to Energy Transfer
Partners. Lead lenders were Citibank, TD Securities, Bank of Tokyo
Mitsubishi UFJ, and Mizuho Bank (Simon 2018).
DAPL runs one-half mile from the Reservation’s boundary, within unceded
Indian territory under Article 16 of the Treaty of Fort Laramie (1868) (Ostler and
Estes 2017). The SRST Tribal Council voiced opposition to the pipeline when
ETP representatives visited the Tribe in September 2014, and continued com
municating their opposition to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE),
charged with permitting the project (Whyte 2020). In April 2016, SRST members
initiated a protest camp near where the pipeline would cross under the Missouri
River, the Tribe’s only water source. Nonetheless, USACE permitted DAPL in
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July 2016 under Nationwide Permit 12, circumventing extensive environmental
review or public consultation, although the Missouri River crossing would
require an additional easement. Immediately, SRST sued USACE, citing a lack
of adequate consultation and violation of the National Historic Preservation Act,
as DAPL threatened important cultural sites. Meanwhile, protest camps contin
ued to attract Native activists, primarily from North and South Dakota. In
September 2016, ETP began construction through a location where Tribal
archeologists had identified cultural sites. Tribal members approached the bull
dozers and were attacked by security officers’ dogs. This event generated exten
sive media attention and attracted additional allies from other states and
countries. Rejecting the term ‘protestor’, activists became known as Water
Protectors. The camps swelled to approximately 10,000 persons (Eid 2018).
The NoDAPL movement built an extensive social media presence (Boscarino
2020). Confrontations with county police were repressed with increasing vio
lence and physical injury to activists throughout October and November 2016;
ultimately, nearly 800 people were arrested. In February 2017, all remaining
campers were evicted, and oil commenced flowing in June. However, the fight
continued in the U.S. court system, and on 25 March 2020 a U.S. federal judge
ruled that ACE had violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in
granting DAPL a permit in 2016 and ordered the Corps to re-examine the risks
and prepare a full environmental impact statement (SRST v. USACE, 2020a). On
6 July 2020 the same court ordered the halt of pipeline operation for the duration
of the impact assessment (SRST v. USACE, 2020b), although an appeals court
allowed oil flow to continue.
Resonance and dissonance at the state and national scales
The NoDAPL movement resonated on both state and national scales in contra
dictory ways, generating dissonance. North Dakota state authorities and the
Obama administration disagreed over how the protests should be handled. In
November 2016, President Obama decided to monitor the situation while
encouraging USACE to explore rerouting the pipeline. This prompted the chair
man of the Morton County commission to accuse the President of ‘creating
further uncertainty’ and ‘putting lives in danger’ (Levin 2016). Morton County’s
police department, with support of the North Dakota government, which
recruited officers from other states, responded to the protests with mass arrests,
rubber bullets, and spraying water in subfreezing temperatures. According to an
IWGIA expert, the ‘most shocking’ ‘was this use of what they call non-lethal
weapons, which wouldn’t be allowed and are against the Geneva Convention’
(Interview, 25 January 2020). In December 2016, the Department of the Army
announced that it would deny ETP a permit to cross under the Missouri River
and would seek alternative routes. However, a freshly-inaugurated President
Trump issued an executive memorandum urging the Corps to reverse its deci
sion and expedite the permitting process, which it did. The earlier dissonance
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between state and federal governments may reflect North Dakota’s heavy eco
nomic reliance on oil extraction as well as expected state-level tax revenue and job
creation.
The protests’ long-term ramifications also resulted in dissonance between
state and national scales. In October-November 2016, the U.S. Departments of
Justice, the Interior, and the Army consulted with 59 Tribes and eight organiza
tions representing Tribal interests on how to allow more ‘timely and meaningful
Tribal input’ into federal ‘decision making on infrastructure and related projects’
(DoI et al. 2017, p. 2). In January 2017, this process resulted in a report (DoI et al.
2017) outlining ‘Key Principles’ for building productive relationships with tribes
toward effective consultation processes. At the request of members of Congress,
the Government Accountability Office conducted further interviews with Tribal
officials and federal agencies and, in March 2019, published a report outlining
‘key factors [. . .] that hinder effective consultation on infrastructure projects’
(Mill 2019, p. 20). While a connection to the NoDAPL movement was never
explicitly articulated, the timing suggests that this revisiting of Tribal consulta
tion processes occurred in response to the SRST protests, exemplifying reso
nance from the grassroots to higher scales of authority.
At the state level, rather than revisiting its consultation practices, North
Dakota institutionalized ‘infrastructure securitization’ (Bosworth forthcoming)
and passed four anti-protest bills between 2017 and 2019. Other states followed
suit; at the time of writing, 25 states had enacted ‘critical infrastructure’ laws
(International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) 2019), which make protest
ing near oil and gas infrastructure a felony, with jail-time penalties.
Resonance at the international scale
The movement appealed to several UN bodies, achieving global resonance
with assistance from the IITC and the Indian Law Resource Center. Through
these alliances ‘we were able to galvanise international attention by utilizing
the United Nations’ (Interview, IITC representative, 27 July 2020) to place
SRST on the global human rights agenda and build a direct connection with
the UN, a global node of design. The Tribe and its allies appealed to four
Special Procedures mandate holders in the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights, namely, Special Rapporteurs on: the situation of human
rights defenders, human rights and the environment, the rights of
Indigenous Peoples, and the human right to safe drinking water and sanita
tion. The last two visited SRST, as did Chief Edward John, Expert Member of
the UNPFII (2016), and the Chair of the UN Working Group on the issue of
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises
(IITC 2017). SRST’s case appeared in several UN reports and statements,
including statements by the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom
of peaceful assembly and association (Kiai 2016) and the Special Rapporteur
on Indigenous Peoples (Tauli-Corpuz 2016), endorsed by other
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aforementioned Rapporteurs. The Tribe presented their case at UN fora of
negotiation (e.g., UN Human Rights Council, UN Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues [UNPFII]). However, a UN official lamented that while his
visit notes ‘were included in the official report of our group for the General
Assembly . . . unfortunately our work was not as successful as people from
Standing Rock expected.’ (Interview, 2 December 2019).
UN recognition has been instrumental in propagating SRST’s message
and fostering international awareness. This elevated attention evoked
inquiries and support from global institutions and organizations, and
prompted international discussions at global fora of negotiation such as
the UNPFII (University of Arizona Law 2018) and COP22 MarrakechInternational Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change, in 2016
(Grassroots Global Justice Alliance 2019). For example, in
December 2016, after Special Procedure mandate holders reported on
the use of excessive police force against demonstrators, the U.S.
Government responded by referring to the additional Tribal consulta
tions held in October-November and to the government’s planned par
ticipation in a hearing before the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN Human
Rights Council 2016). In other words, grassroots appeals resonated at
the global scale, which resonated back to the national scale.
The NoDAPL movement also invoked UN concepts in lobbying investors,
achieving resonance within the banking sector. Although the U.S. does not fully
recognize the right to Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) as articulated in
the UNDRIP (United Nations 2007), which they view as aspirational and
nonbinding, water protectors reached out to the banks financing DAPL, arguing
that ETP had not obtained FPIC (Investor Statement 2017). This pressure, along
with the fact that protests directly cost investors around 750 USD million (Eid
2018), prompted a coalition of concerned investors to work hand-in-hand with
activists in the Investors and Indigenous Peoples Working Group (IIPWG).
Over 500 NGOs collected over 700,000 signatures, resulting in the closure of
bank accounts worth over 4 USD billion, and over 160 investors (managing over
1.7 USD trillion combined) signed a statement urging the banks financing DAPL
to support the SRST’s request for a reroute (Investor Statement 2017). Three
banks divested from DAPL: BNP Paribas, DNB, and ING (Simon 2018), and the
Seattle City Council severed ties with Wells Fargo Bank because of its financing
of the pipeline.
The NoDAPL movement’s targeting of specific banks resonated to the
entire banking sector, stimulating reform. In May 2017, ten major banks
publicly expressed concerns that the Equator Principles – a framework for
financial institutions to identify and manage environmental and social risk –
needed revision to ‘avoid similar situations in the future’ (ABN AMRO et al.
2017). In November 2019, the Equator Principles Association finalized
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a revised set of principles specifically strengthening commitments on human
rights and FPIC, effective July 2020 (Equator Principles 2019).
Amplification
Amplification of the NoDAPL movement happened in several ways. First,
the struggle attracted support from other Indigenous groups within the
U.S. and around the world. By August 2016, over 87 U.S and Canadian
Tribal governments had passed resolutions, issued proclamations, or sent
letters in support of SRST (ICTMN 2016). Representatives from many
Indigenous ethnicities, from North America and across the globe, traveled
to North Dakota to join the resistance camps.
Non-Indigenous persons and organizations also joined NoDAPL, con
tributing to the movement in a variety of ways, including legal support,
provision of goods and services, advocacy, and participation in camp
activities. Many of these groups had their own agendas, amplifying the
movement beyond the original focus on Indigenous sovereignty and
Environmental Justice, particularly toward the fight against fossil fuels
as a cause of climate change. However, while some SRST activists
embraced the anti-fossil fuel agenda, others resented what they saw as
co-optation of their struggle for sovereignty and protection of their
water source:
All the environmentalists that came, they were no better than the government.
They didn’t want to listen to the wishes of the local people. What we wanted to
do, they forgot. They all had their own little causes: keep it in the ground, wind
energy, solar energy . . . and then pretty soon they forgot about the pipe[line].
And we were fighting them as well. (Interview, 27 May 2018)

Concurrently, NoDAPL influenced similar, ongoing Indigenous-led resis
tance to pipelines in places such as Minnesota, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, and
Louisiana, and even other countries. According to an IITC representative
(Interview, 27 July 2020), the Yaqui Tribe in northern Mexico directly relied
on SRST’s experiences to fight Sempra Energy’s Agua Prieta pipeline in their
homelands. Additionally, activists, both Lakota/Dakota and non-Indigenous,
who had been involved with the movement, brought the knowledge gained
through their experiences to other environmental struggles: ‘For all these
people that came here to help us, I wanted to give something back to them,
whether they’re Indigenous or not, so when I went to Massachusetts, that was
non-Indigenous people’ (Interview, 3 June 2018).
The protest against oil infrastructure in the Komi Republic
Russia’s socio-economic system, since 2000, has been characterized as ‘state
capitalism’ with consolidation of state control over political and economic
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spheres (Aslund 2007). Russia’s economic development is highly dependent on
oil and gas. Oil spills frequently happen in places with outdated pipeline
infrastructure, such as Komi Republic. Russian law on ‘foreign agents’ (2012)
facilitated the prosecution of NGO and Indigenous associations critical of the
state, especially those that make international appeals. Despite this unfavorable
context, federalism allows for variation in relationships between Indigenous
associations, NGOs and the state (Tysiachniouk et al. 2018). Cooperative
relations are common between civic activists and regional authorities. In the
Komi Republic, social movements have persisted for several decades (Pierk and
Tysiachniouk 2016).
Oil is the Komi Republic’s main export; along with coal and gas, oil
generates 50% of Komi’s GDP (Alexander 2009). Lukoil-Komi, the largest
oil and gas company in Komi, plays a significant role in the region’s oil
industry (Staalesen 2014). Komi-Izhemtsy are involved in reindeer herding
and are recognized as Indigenous by the Indigenous Peoples’ association
RAIPON, but not by the Russian state (RAIPON 2014).
The anti-pipeline movement in Komi arose during Perestroika. The Save
Pechora Committee (SPC), an environmental grassroots group named after
the local river, formed in 1989 (Pierk and Tysiachniouk 2016). After a 1994 oil
spill near the town of Usinsk, SPC and the Komi-Izhemtsy Indigenous orga
nization, Izviatas, started fighting outdated pipeline infrastructure. The chair
person of Izviatas claimed that ‘a better situation can only be achieved by the
resistance of the people’ (Interview, 20 February 2015). According to a villagebased activist, ‘the spills have caused health problems among the population, as
well as economic problems, constraints on livelihoods and a feeling among the
population of betrayal by the government’ (Interview, 21 February 2015).
Although Lukoil has stated that it plans to modernize all pipelines by 2025,
local activists doubt this (Wilson and Istomin 2019). One activist stated: ‘Local
villagers are poorly informed about future plans, for example, oil infrastructure
was built within 1.5 km of a school in Krasnobor in the Izma district, and in other
places near water wells’ (Interview, 20 February 2015). Grievances related to oil
spills, as well as the lack of recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ rights, led to an
Indigenous/environmental movement stretching from grassroots to global level.
SPC organizes protests against outdated oil infrastructure, monitors the imple
mentation of environmental legislation, and advocates for the legislation to ban
aging oil pipelines. In December 2017, SPC members staged a week-long protest
in Ust-Usa and Novikboz, villages affected by oil exploration (see Figure 3). In
2018, members protested new construction planned in the Pechora River flood
plain, but ultimately, this new infrastructure was built. SPC has closely coop
erated with Izviatas, Greenpeace and the youth volunteer organization,
Stopoilspills.

906

MARIA S. TYSIACHNIOUK ET AL.

Figure 3. Sites of protest in the Komi Republic.

Dissonance at the regional and national scales
Dissonance results from dissimilarities in the regional and national govern
ments’ responses to the protests. The Komi Republic government was gen
erally collaborative with the protesters and cooperated on oil spill
monitoring. The federal government, in contrast, proceeded with its consis
tent policy to disempower Indigenous organizations and limit international
human rights activists’ access to them (Rohr 2014).
The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection of
Komi Republic acknowledged that eighty percent of Lukoil pipelines are
outdated and shared the social movement’s concerns. Therefore, they
allowed Greenpeace to organize summer camps for volunteers in Usinsk
and have local volunteers search for oil spills. The Ministry collaborated with
Greenpeace and SPC to create an oil-leak database (Pierk and Tysiachniouk
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2016). However, this collaboration did not result in any legislation to ban
worn-out pipelines as the movement advocated.
In contrast, federal authorities viewed the Komi protests as an element of
the national Indigenous protest movement, which they were repressing across
the country. One tactic was labelling Indigenous associations and environ
mental NGOs ‘foreign agents,’ a status that imposes fines and restricts activities
of civil society actors that receive foreign grants. (Tysiachniouk et al. 2018).
Another tactic was to foster leadership change. In RAIPON, Yasavey, and
Izviatas, state officials replaced Indigenous leaders, converting Indigenous
associations to state policy promoters. Therefore, Komi-Izhemtsy protesters
were not reaching out to global fora through RAIPON, but developed alliances
with global organizations, such as IWGIA. The federal government, in turn,
suppressed these allies’ appeals to the UN, e.g. banning an IWGIA expert from
visiting Russia for fifty years after he exposed violations of Indigenous Peoples’
rights in Komi.
Resonance at the international scale
Despite the federal government’s attempts to limit international support,
Izviatas collaborated with Greenpeace International and IWGIA in its strug
gles with the oil company and in its fight for Indigenous status (Rohr, 2014). By
developing alliances with these international NGOs, Komi-Izhemtsy were able
to access nodes of global design, such as the United Nations. IWGIA tried to
pressure the Russian government by publishing reports about the Russian
state’s repression of Indigenous Peoples, directed to several UN committees,
including the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD), the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR),
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). This
direct local-to-global interlinking brought international attention to the KomiIzhemtsy People’s struggle leading to discussions at UNPFII and other
Indigenous Peoples’ fora. IWGIA argued that the Russian state was denying
Indigenous Peoples the right to practice traditional livelihoods, including fail
ure to obtain consent before beginning extractive activities (CERD 2008).
Russia formally responded by denying any discrimination.
Meanwhile, Lukoil-Komi’s activities have resonated to global Internet spaces.
An international NGO, Bankwatch, monitors companies that received European
Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) loans, including LukoilKomi. Bankwatch reported that Lukoil-Komi blocks information about its
environmental violations through ‘fee-based contracts’ with ‘members of the
mass media’ (CEE Bankwatch Network 2008, p. 2), and that in May 2006,
Lukoil-Komi bought out an entire edition of the newspaper Novyi Sever after
the newspaper published an article on the company’s environmental violations.
As a condition of its loans, EBRD has required Lukoil to improve its environ
mental performance in 2007, in exchange for a loan of 300 USD million, Lukoil
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committed to ‘inter alia pollution cleanup, pipeline replacement, gas flaring
reduction, health and safety measures, and social infrastructure’ (EBRD 2007).
EBRD also required Lukoil to compensate Khanty, Mansi and Nenets Peoples,
who the Russian Federation recognizes as Indigenous. In contrast, in Komi,
Bankwatch filed an appeal to EBRD, but received little traction (Tysiachnouk
et al. 2018b) mainly because the Komi-Izhemtsy Peoples are not federallyrecognized.
Amplification
The SPC-Izviatas social movement’s experience has been shared globally and
in other regions of Russia. Representatives of Izviatas participated in the 2015
Arctic Council meeting in Iqaluit, Canada, where Izviatas advised the
Nunavut people to ban drilling around the region (Pierk and Tysiachniouk
2016). Greenpeace sponsored SPC to share experiences of Komi protests with
Indigenous Peoples in Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug and in Taimyr.
The SPC shared the Komi resistance story at a gathering of Saami reindeer
herders in Sweden. Stopoilspills volunteers spread information about prac
tices of oil extraction in the Komi Republic to youth in Russian big cities.
SPC engages in protests on other issues such as fighting landfills and climate
change. Throughout 2019, they participated in actions against the Shies Landfill
slated for construction at the border between the Komi Republic and the
Arkhangelsk Oblast (Chmel et al. 2020). In September 2019, SPC, Greenpeace
and Stopoilspills participated in the Worldwide Climate Week protests to raise
public awareness about the impacts of oil development in Komi.

Discussion
Existing literature demonstrates that through application of globally developed
standards, such as forestry certification, GGNs generate new policies and
practices in places around the globe, and more territories are becoming
involved in sustainability-oriented governance arrangements (Tysiachniouk
and McDermott 2016). The same tendency can be seen in oil sector GGNs
when companies take loans from lenders that adopt global standards
(Tysiachniouk et. al 2018a). This paper’s case studies, however, demonstrate
that even if governance of pipelines remains unchanged locally, new govern
ance may be generated at other scales. This new governance arrangement may
enhance or impede Indigenous rights, as it plays out differently in divergent
local contexts.
The Komi and DAPL cases manifest important similarities. Although in
both cases the movements’ original goals were not achieved, they instigated
transformations both locally and at state/regional, national, and global scales
involving both ‘politics of scale’ and ‘scale frame’ controversies in the GGNs
(Edge and Eyles 2014, Neville and Weinthal 2016). Both protests recruited
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Indigenous and environmental NGOs with broader interests than placebased activism. By forging local-to-global networks and appealing to global
organizations and fora, both movements were able to ‘jump’ scales, challen
ging national laws and institutions (Smith 1992). By mobilizing Indigenous
solidarity and enlisting global NGOs, these localized Indigenous Peoples’
movements resonated and amplified their message and transformed com
munity-government-company relationships. Furthermore, these movements
stimulated broader discussions around the issues of Indigenous rights, water
quality, climate change, extractive capitalism and sustainability, both at the
global scale and within nation-states.
However, the case studies also indicate limits to resonance. Appeals to the
global level led neither company to change its practices. This contrasts with
most studies of GGN in the forestry and extractive industry sectors, in which
companies changed their practices to respect Indigenous and local commu
nities’ rights and engage in benefit-sharing in conformance with global
standards (Spar and La Mure 2003, Kortelainen et al. 2010, Pierk and
Tysiachniouk 2016, Tysiachniouk et al. 2018a, Van Rooy 2004).
Despite divergent political, economic, and geographic contexts, a variety of
factors underpin similarities between these two movements. First, the protests
focused on issues common to Indigenous Peoples’ struggles around the globe,
e.g. land stewardship, cultural vitality, spirituality, heritage and Indigenous
rights (Horowitz 2017, Zanotto 2020). Gaps in legislation, poor implementa
tion of laws, lack of recognition, unresolved property rights, problematic
historical legacies, and other compounding factors are creating highly con
tested spaces of governance, where the resultant conflict is unresolvable at the
local scale. In response, emergent GGNs appeal to other scales attempting to
establish new governance frameworks and introducing resonances, disso
nances, and amplifications.
At the same time, the differences between the two case studies are also
very telling. The dissonance between the regional and national scales in the
U.S. and Russia played out differently. NoDAPL attracted opposition from
the state and general support from the Obama-era federal government and
the international community. Although the GGN in the Komi movement
formed around similar grievances, regional and federal authorities exhibited
dissonance in an opposite manner, with the regional government supporting
the movement while federal authorities attempted to suppress it.
The Commerce Clause of the US Constitution and Federal Indian Law
(Newton et al. 2019) prescribe government-to-government relationships
with Tribes and delineate responsibilities of the federal government towards
Tribes. States’ authority over Indian affairs is very limited, and states have no
trust responsibility to tribes; moreover, they may challenge the notion of
tribal sovereignty (Rome 2018). DAPL was planned on treaty lands as
described in the Fort Laramie Treaty, which North Dakota did not recognize
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(Bell 2017, Mengden 2017). Because of this treaty, the Tribe sees the conflict
as being between two sovereign nations: themselves and the U.S.
Additionally, North Dakota was expecting to receive considerable revenues
from the operation of the pipeline, and thus had an economic interest to
suppress the protest movement.
In contrast, in Russia, land belongs to the state, and Indigenous Peoples’
sovereignty is not recognized; therefore, Indigenous associations are treated
like other NGOs. Moreover, when Indigenous associations receive foreign
money and participate in political activity, they are subjected to the ‘foreign
agent’ law and their ability to influence policy is diminished (Tysiachniouk
et al. 2018). In addition, the Russian state does not formally recognize the
Komi-Izhemtsy Indigenous People, further undermining their rights.
Meanwhile, relationships between regional governments and Indigenous
associations and NGOs have been cooperative. One reason was that regional
authorities were incentivized to record environmental violations in order to
combat oil spills and receive pipeline operator fines.
Amplifications in the two cases were also different. While the Komi
movement embraced a broader environmental agenda and expanded to
another geographical location, specifically protests against the Shiyes
Landfill in a nearby region, SRST members often expressed reservations
about the attempt by some allies to inject broader issues, such as the fight
against the fossil fuels, into NoDAPL.
In both cases, it was hard to legally contest oil infrastructure construction.
This can partly explain the emergence of a bottom-up GGN in each case,
involving outreach to global UN-based institutions. In Russia, similar
appeals of Indigenous groups from other regions to the UN also did not
deliver positive results, limiting resonance (Tulaeva et al. 2019). This can be
linked to repressive state policy. In addition, the Komi campaign was smaller
and had fewer resources than NoDAPL, which also limited its resonance.
We expanded GGN theory, which previously focused mostly on local and
global scales (see Figure 1), by demonstrating resonances, dissonances, and
amplifications at the national and regional scales, as illustrated by both case
studies (see Figure 4). In other words, our extended GGN conceptualization
highlights the multiscalarity and dynamism of GGNs and articulates the role
of national and regional scales in GGNs alongside the global and local ones.
Each vertical network, including the state and company, has both top-down
and bottom-up mechanisms of transmitting information, such as grievances
from the bottom to the top, or enforcement of global standards from top to
bottom. Civil society/Indigenous networks in Komi and SRST precipitated
grievances that traveled from the local to global levels. At the same time, activities
from the bottom resonated regionally and nationally. Different levels of govern
ance reacted in opposite ways, exhibiting dissonance. The movements operated
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Figure 4. Amplification, resonance, and dissonance in GGNs.

under different political, economic, and social contexts, which led to different
types of dissonance between federal and state/regional governments.

Conclusions
In the NoDAPL and Komi movements, grassroots bottom-up grievances gen
erated GGNs with appeals to global nodes of design. Although these processes
did not necessarily change local practices in the sites of implementation, they
produced effects at different governance scales and geographical locales, namely
amplification, resonance, and dissonance. These in turn became drivers of
change in policies and interactions among actors involved at different levels of
governance. Although both the NoDAPL and Komi movements protested
locally and appealed globally and affected policies on national and regional
levels, the pipeline construction continued in North Dakota and oil spills
persisted in the Komi Republic. At the federal level, the Russian state ignored
appeals to global institutions and suppressed Indigenous associations and their
transnational NGO allies. In contrast, the U.S. acknowledged the need for more
consultations with Indigenous people affected by oil infrastructure. However, at
the regional level, North Dakota did not recognize Indigenous treaty lands and
enacted anti-protest legislation to preserve its economic interests. On the con
trary, in Russia, the Komi government collaborated with NGOs and Indigenous
people to combat oil spills. Therefore, while both movements produced reso
nance across multiple scales, the nature and scope of these effects were markedly
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different because of social, political, and economic context, as well as the protests’
scope and resources.
While Indigenous protest movements and struggles can be examined from
a variety of theoretical perspectives, the GGN framework appears to be particu
larly helpful in these two cases because it illuminates and explains networked
interactions between diverse actors at and across different scales. The GGN lens
enables us to elucidate how globally-connected networks often attempt to deal
with well-recognized causes of discontent and contestation, such as legislative
gaps and inconsistencies, controversial historical legacies, unresolved political
conflicts, etc. by engaging alternative scales of governance and creating alter
native governance frameworks that circumvent, complement, or contest existing
arrangements. The GGN approach delineates the structure and agency in the
global/local interplay of actors operating across scalar hierarchies and exercising
power and authority while engaging in ‘politics of scale.’
Future work needs to investigate evidence of GGN formation and opera
tion, as well as GGNs’ impact across scales of governance and geographical
spaces, by analyzing more cases in diverse sociopolitical contexts and locations.
Revealing these experiences will help understand grassroots Indigenous move
ments, their dynamics, effectiveness, and ability to promote ecological democ
racy in the overall decline of liberal democracy (Eckersley 2020). As extractive
and other industrial activities continue to spread across Indigenous Peoples’
homelands, this knowledge will be instrumental in promoting more balanced
and sustainable development in these areas based on fair and equitable sharing
of benefits and recognition of globally enacted Indigenous rights.
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